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SCHROEDER LECTURE
REFORMING THE U.S. HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM:
WHAT THE LEGAL & MEDICAL
PROFESSIONS NEED TO KNOW*
Arnold S. Relmant
Good afternoon, everyone. It is a great honor to be here on this
occasion. I appreciate that I am the first physician in this distin-
guished series of speakers. So I have an obligation to say things that
will be of interest to you and meaningful to your profession, as well as
to mine.
Today I am going to talk about the American health care system.
It is not really a system. It is a dysfunctional, disordered, and chaotic
series of arrangements for the financing and delivery of health care,
which we call a system. First, I will talk about it from a historical
point of view: how it got to be what it is now. Then I am going to tell
you why I call it dysfunctional and chaotic, why it is totally inade-
quate, and why it has to change. I do not know whether it will be in
my lifetime or not, but it has to change. And then I will give you my
own interpretation of the contending forces that are now trying to
shape the future of American health care, and end up with my own
vision of where we ought to be and why we ought to be there.
First of all, let me say a word about health care systems in gen-
eral. They have several parts and when you think about how to
change them, you must be very careful to think of all the parts. All
the parts are interconnected, but sometimes people have a special fi-
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nancial interest in one part of the system and act as if there were only
that one part when, in reality, everything is important. The first part
has to do with funding. Health care costs money. If it did not cost
money, I would have nothing to talk about and we would not have a
problem, but it costs a lot of money. And one important part of the
system is figuring out where the funding should come from and find-
ing an arrangement that is equitable and affordable.
The second thing about our health care system is that unlike most
other parts of our economy, it requires some form of insurance.
Medical care is the kind of service that sometimes is so expensive that
virtually none of us can afford it. Moreover, if something really bad
happens to you and you need the services of the health care system,
you cannot postpone the expense. So the only sensible thing to do is
to insure yourself against those costs, just the way you would insure
yourself against the costs of having your house bum down. Not many
of us could personally afford the economic consequences of having
our house bum down, so we have fire insurance.
Another important part of the health care system has to do with
the actual delivery of care. First of all, there are the health care pro-
fessionals, the physicians, the dentists, the nurses, and all the other
technical people who provide health care services. And then there are
the facilities, the institutions, hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes
where the care is provided. Finally, you have the tools and the equip-
ment, the drugs, and the medical supplies needed to deliver medical
care. How are the providers and suppliers of these necessary services
and goods to be paid; and should they be regulated?
Together, all of these elements comprise a health care system, and
how well they work together determines the success of the system. In
1963, a professor of economics at Stanford by the name of Kenneth
Arrow took a look at the U.S. health care "market." He wanted to see
whether health care really is a market in the classical sense. And he
concluded that it was quite different from the kinds of markets
economists are familiar with.
In the American Economic Review in 1963 Arrow wrote an
analysis of health care markets, which was the first theoretical study
of the economics of health care. And it was in part for this work that
he later won the Nobel Prize. He was a very smart man, but he ap-
proached health care with the kind of innocence that children some-
times have when they approach a subject they know nothing about.
Arrow looked at the health care market and concluded that it was not
like any other market known in economics.
First, Arrow said, there is no way to anticipate the demand for
health care, but it is often urgent. And he said when you need health
care you sometimes need it so badly that you cannot act like a con-
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sumer. You are sick, you are scared, you may be incapacitated, and
you cannot be a consumer choosing a product that you may or may
not want to buy at a price that you may or may not want to pay. The
supply is not determined by what people want, it is determined by the
medical care they need. Nowadays with direct to consumer advertis-
ing, we all may think we need Viagra and Claritin, and we may want
them, but we only get them if they are prescribed by our physician.
For the most part, the supply is determined by the medical needs of
the patient and this is not judged by the patient. Patients say to their
physician in effect, I am sick or injured, and worried. I do not know
what is wrong or how to heal myself, but that is why I need you. A
sick or injured patient is not an independent economic agent, shopping
around for what he or she needs.
Second, Arrow recognized that entry into the medical "market" is
limited by professional licensure, and the time and expense required
to complete medical education. This restriction on entry, of course, is
an essential protection. Caveat emptor will not protect your life when
you need medical care. You have to trust the competence of your
physician, and this is protected by the limitations on entry of "suppli-
ers" into the market.
Another point that Arrow made was that price sensitivity is very
low in health care. When you are sick you do not worry about price.
God forbid that tomorrow morning, one of you should wake up with
blinding headaches, and you consult a neurologist who examines you.
He does a CAT scan or MRI and says, "You have a brain tumor and it
must be removed or you will die." You do not say, "Well, how much
is that going to cost me? What I want, since I am strapped this year
and I have got kids in college, is a cut-rate, stripped of all frills, basic
neurosurgical procedure. The cheapest you can give me. I do not
want to buy a surgical Mercedes, I want a Hyundai." You do not say
that. You want the best possible treatment and price doesn't control
the decision to have the operation.
Arrow's most insightful perception about the health care "market"
was what he called the "asymmetry of information" between provider
and buyer. In most markets, if you do not know what product you
want to buy, you can find out. You can go to a publication from a
consumers' union, or you can ask people, you can read the ads, you
can take a test drive, and if you still do not know, there are many other
ways to find out. In health care it is very difficult for you to have an
equivalent amount of information about your medical condition or
your doctor. You have got to depend heavily on the doctor's opinions
and advice, and that asymmetry makes it impossible for ordinary mar-
ket forces to work.
2005]
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Arrow concluded that health care cannot be regulated by the ordi-
nary mechanisms of the free market. You have to depend on non-
market mechanisms. Professional licensure, certification, medical
ethics, law, trust between patient and doctor, all of these things regu-
late the market, not the give and take between supply and demand."
Arrow published that article in 1963. Economists read it and thought
about it. A few of us doctors who could understand what he had to
say agreed with him and his conclusion. We recognized that if we
want to regulate health care in the interest of the public, we cannot
depend on the mechanisms of the market; we have to depend on other
means.
Unfortunately Arrow's insight was quickly overshadowed by sub-
sequent events and largely ignored. In 1965, Lyndon Johnson finally
persuaded the medical profession to accept government insurance.
He said he was not going to socialize medicine; he was not going to
put government in charge of the practice of medicine. All he said the
government asked of the profession was the assurance that they would
charge Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries the same fees they would
charge anybody else. And, of course, government would need assur-
ance that the doctors really did provide the services they billed for.
And in 1966 Medicare and Medicaid went into effect and it was the
beginning of the commercial expansion and exploitation of health
care. Eli Ginzberg, professor of Economics at Columbia, and a very
astute observer, used the term "monetization." He said it was the
monetization of health care through public insurance, Medicare and
Medicaid, and then later through private insurance, that transformed
U.S. health care from a social service to an industry. Employers were
adding health care insurance as part of salary fringe benefits for their
workers. There were wage and price controls at the time, and the only
way that the workers could get their demands for increased rewards
was through benefits, and health care was one of them. So it was the
rapid expansion of public and private insurance that fed vast amounts
of new money into the system.
And during the same period, we saw an enormous expansion of
specialization in medicine and the development of new technology.
This caused more money being devoted to expensive, specialized ser-
vices. And all of this attracted investment in the health care system
that never existed before. Beginning in the late 1960s and early
1970s, investor-owned hospital chains appeared, followed by inves-
tor-owned clinics, diagnostic centers, nursing homes, and so forth.
At the same time the courts decided that the so-called learned pro-
fessions, were not that much different from businesses in their eco-
nomic behavior. Therefore, the reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act
and all the other antitrust legislation extended to the professions. In
[Vol. 15:423
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Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,' the Supreme Court said the Sherman
Act applies to lawyers and, by implication, other professions as well.
But the Court had some reservations about the scope of its opinion.
For instance, Chief Justice Burger in a footnote to his opinions said he
was not quite sure he wanted to go all the way and say that the learned
professions were not different from ordinary business, 2 and we might
want to revisit this. But he voted with the majority. And, in any
event, antitrust law began to be applied to the practice of law and to
the practice of medicine, and that had a powerful effect on changing
our health care system into something resembling a "market."
In those early days, most insurance companies were not interested
in health care. They insured property and life and so on, but they later
began to see that with all this money now being spent on health care,
there was a new market that promised new revenues and big profits.
So insurance companies rushed into that market, went public and be-
came investor owned managed care plans.
Investors in vast numbers began to put their money into health
care: hospitals, insurance plans, nursing homes, and all sorts of ambu-
latory clinics. Even physicians began to invest in hospitals and clin-
ics in which they practiced.
Now, when medical care becomes a business, certain things fol-
low. Think about this: businesses must grow if they are going to suc-
ceed. Growth is imperative. That means you must get people to
spend more and more money on health care. Therefore, the growth
imperative is going to drive expenditures on health care way up.
Also, when business begins to provide medical insurance and medical
care, there are large overhead, management, and outsourcing ex-
penses. Health care businesses employ brokers, lawyers, marketing
experts, business consultants, information technology people and so
on. With each added person, overhead goes up and up and health
insurance premiums do the same.
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2 Berger stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular re-
straint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the prac-
tice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and
automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated
in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the profes-
sions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be
viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated dif-
ferently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with
which we are confronted today.
Id. at 788 n.17.
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The growth imperative resulted in a sharp increase in the rate at
which health care expenses increased. Health care expenditures be-
gan to increase at ten to twelve percent per year, due in large part to
the overhead, management, outsourcing and administrative expenses
of a business-run medical care system. My best guess is that at least a
third of what we now spend on health care as a nation goes to support
the overhead and management expenses of a medical care delivery
system that is heavily commercialized.
Furthermore, another imperative of business as it grows is to seg-
ment the market. That is what they teach students at the Harvard
Business School: divide your market and do what you can do best and
most profitably, and leave the rest to others. Piecework, rather than
integrated health care, becomes the name of the game. And what was
a holistic approach to health care now becomes fragmented and scat-
tered. There is no single, overall responsibility for the patient. The
profession of medicine started out with the idea that its primary re-
sponsibility was to serve patients, not to make money. It is not that
way any longer, as income, market share and promotion of services
begin to be at least as important as taking the best care of patients.
When I graduated from medical school, very few of my class-
mates thought they would get rich. Most thought they would drive a
Ford or a Buick, own a house, be able to educate their kids, be eco-
nomically comfortable, but not rich. The purpose of medicine was to
be the best possible doctor you could be. But that has changed.
Nowadays, far too many graduates think of their profession primarily
as a business. They think about the money they are going to make.
And while they want to be competent physicians and not harm pa-
tients, it is the money that is ultimately important.
There are a lot of things wrong with the system, but everything
can be boiled down to money. When business incentives dominate the
system, and when most payment is on a piecework basis, there is in-
exorable pressure to provide more services for those who are ade-
quately insured or can pay out of pocket. As Arrow saw so clearly,
the physicians control the demand, so expenditures inevitably rise.
Those who are not insured adequately, or are uninsured, are marginal-
ized and underserved. Government and business employers, who pay
most of the costs of insurance, are pressed so hard that they are forced
to reduce insurance benefits, reduce the number of beneficiaries and
add to the numbers of uninsured. Attempts by government and pri-
vate insurers to cut costs by reducing prices simply lead to increased
volume and complexity of services, as doctors and hospitals attempt
to maintain their income.
In an effort to control costs, the Bush administration is promoting
a new initiative called "consumer-directed health care." The idea is
[Vol. 15:423
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that consumers should play more of a role, that health care should be
directed by consumers. The Bush administration likes to put it in
grandiose terms. They say it is the "ownership society." People
should own their own health care plan, be in charge of their health
care, and decide what they want to pay. And when they have to pay
more of the cost of their care, they will have some stake in the care
being more efficient. People will not ask for too much health care and
costs will be controlled.
And so the way to make all this work is to encourage people to
buy low premium, high deductible plans, which put the consumer at
greater risk. In addition, the government or your employer sets up a
health savings account, which is like an IRA. You can use the ac-
count to help pay your deductible health care costs. And if you do not
spend it, the account rolls over and accumulates tax-free. This is a
great deal for well-to-do, healthy people. They end up with a big tax-
free IRA. But if you are poor and need medical care, you face the
choice of spending your account or not getting the care you need.
"Empowering" the patient, as promoted by the Bush Administra-
tion, really means giving the patient responsibility for paying. This
idea fits in with a currently popular philosophy: If you are rich, you
can do pretty well, but if you are poor and sick, God help you.
"Consumer-directed health care" is very popular with conserva-
tive politicians and business people, but it isn't fair and it won't pro-
duce much savings in the long run. It isn't fair because it puts the
greatest financial pressure on those with limited income to hold back
on services, and it won't save very much because most health care
costs are incurred by the big-ticket, expensive items that will be cov-
ered by catastrophic insurance.
With that in mind here is what I predict: "consumer-directed
health care" will play itself out over the next five to ten years, by
which time it will become perfectly clear it has not worked. Medicare
will be going broke, government will be accumulating vast deficits,
and private business will not be able to afford the costs of health care
for its employees. We will have to try something else that will control
costs without denying access to necessary care for all.
Well, then, what will work? Here is my idea. We need a single
efficient insurance system instead of all the multiple insurance sys-
tems and multiple transactional costs of billing and collecting. We
need one insurance system and it should be funded from some sort of
earmarked tax base to which employers contribute appropriately. I do
not think employers ought to be taken off the hook and told they do
not have to pay for their employees' health insurance. Employers
should pay part of the cost of a single insurance system. Such a sys-
tem, which would have minimal administrative overhead, should save
2005]
tens of billions of dollars. There would be no billing costs because the
insurance plan would pay for specified comprehensive care, on a capi-
tated basis.
Right now, for the most part, what we have is insurance that cov-
ers benefits paid on a piecework basis. We should change to a system
where the care is guaranteed and it is paid up front, per capita. Now,
many people who are in favor of a single payer system want to stop
there. They say that will save a lot of money. That is true, but it will
not adequately control cost inflation. As long as you have the pro-
viders of health care being paid on a piecework basis, the incentives to
do more and to use more technology-to promote the use of services,
whether they are needed or not-will still be there.
You need to have a capitated, prepaid delivery system and the
doctors have to be paid, not on a piecework basis, but by salaries.
Furthermore, they have to practice together. They have to work to-
gether the way they do in the Mayo Clinic, or in the Kaiser Health
Plan, or in the Health Care Cooperative of Puget Sound (Seattle), or in
the Harvard Vanguard Health Plan of Boston. Physicians need to
work in groups to provide the best possible care for a given prepaid
premium.
What about hospitals? I think we should convert to a fully not-
for-profit system of health facilities. We should not allow any new
investor-owned facilities and should gradually buy out the existing
ones, turning most of them over to private non-profit community-
based trustees. I do not favor establishment of more government-
owned or managed medical facilities. Private, not-for-profit owner-
ship and management should be the model and there should be regu-
lated competition among them for physician-directed patient referrals.
In Canada there is a single-payer universal insurance system,
which operates very efficiently, but is not sufficiently funded. This
has recently led to pressure for adding private insurance plans to the
system. But if Canada spent nearly as much money per capita, on its
health care as we do, it would probably have the finest system in the
world without breaching the solidarity of its public, single-payer sys-
tem. Our problem is not that we don't spend enough money. It is the
system that needs reforming. With a better system of insurance and
medical care delivery, we could provide excellent care for all our peo-
ple-without spending much more money.
All that we need is the political will to make the necessary
changes. This will be resisted by the vested interests in U.S. health
care businesses. The tide will probably not turn until the rest of U.S.
business (which pays for health care), along with the public and the
medical profession, finally realize that there is no viable option to a
major restructuring of our health care system. It will be difficult, and
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slow in coming, but I believe it is inevitable. Our present arrange-
ments cannot survive much longer, although things may have to get
much worse before there will be enough popular support for the nec-
essary changes.

